Janssen and Rasmusen (2002) show that a Bertrand model with an uncertain number of firms has only one symmetric equilibrium, and profits in that equilibrium fit the empirical data in Bresnahan and Reiss (1991). However, unless its equilibrium is unique, Janssen and Rasmusen's model cannot be...

Strategic interactions between two-sided platforms depend not only on whether their decision variables are strategic complements or substitutes as for one-sided firms, but also - and crucially so - on whether or not the platforms subsidize one side of the market in equilibrium. For example, with...

We examine the relation between consumer search and equilibrium prices when collusion is endogenously determined. We develop a theoretical model and show that average price is a U-shaped function of the measure of searchers: prices are highest when there are no searchers (local monopoly power)...

This paper presents a model in which a monopoly platform not only operates a marketplace intermediating direct transactions between consumers and third-party sellers, but also sells its first-party products at the marketplace, which is designated herein as platform encroachment. When...

We empirically test the hypothesis that the discounts offered by firms to consumers who purchase tickets in advance increase with the intensity of competition. We develop a new measure of competition for which we use the proximity (in departure time) of a given flight to its competitors to infer...

In 2004, the US Supreme Court denied certiorari in LePage's, Inc. v. 3M. The decision ended a hotly contested litigation, but it fueled the controversy and debate over the competitive effects of bundled rebates and discounts. The Supreme Court's decision followed the recommendations of the US...

In this paper, we tackle the dilemma of pruning versus proliferation in a vertically differentiated oligopoly under the assumption that some firms collude and control both the range of variants for sale and their corresponding prices, likewise a multiproduct firm. We analyse whether pruning...

Price promotions and bundling have been two of the most widely used marketing tools in industry practice. Past literature has assumed that firms respond to price promotions by promoting a product in the same category. In this paper, we extend this literature as well as the bundling literature by...

This paper investigates the determination of the merchant usage fee of a monopolistic unitary payment card network based on characteristics of the downstream market. Merchants engage in Bertrand price competition that allows for an observation of heterogeneous products. We find that the payment...

The US Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission receive notification regarding thousands of mergers per year, and must identify, from the entire set of mergers, those that require further investigation. Merger screens are critical to efficient and effective merger enforcement policy,...