Kutlu (2009, “Price discrimination in Stackelberg competitionâ€, Journal of Industrial Economics) shows that the Stackelberg leader sells to the highest value consumers and only the Stackelberg follower practises price discrimination. We show that this result is not robust if the...

We introduce in this paper the "incomplete" third-degree price discrimination, which is the situation where a monopolist must charge at most k different prices while the total market is composed of n markets, with nk. We thus study the optimal partition problem of the n markets in k groups. As a...

The standard approach to identifying second degree price discrimination is based on examining correlations between product menus and prices. When product menus are endogenous, however, tests for price discrimination may be biased by the fact that unobservables affecting costs or demand may...

Governments throughout the developed world worry incessantly about the implications of sophisticated tax planning for their tax revenues. And yet the same governments routinely stop short of doing all that they can legally do to combat tax avoidance. Why? One response is that a thick conception...

This paper examines the welfare effects of third degree price discrimination by an intermediate good monopolist selling to downstream firms with bargaining power. One of the downstream firms (the "chain store") may have a greater ability than rivals to integrate backward into the supply of the...