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Becoming "we" instead of "I", identity management and incentives in the workplace
Donze, Jocelyn; Gunnes, Trude - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 148 (2018), pp. 105-120
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011985958
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Empowerment and the Dark Side of Delegation
Kräkel, Matthias - 2018
The existing delegation literature has focused on different preferences of principal and agent concerning project selection, which makes delegating authority costly for the principal. This paper shows that delegation has a cost even when the preferences of principal and agent are exogenously...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012929070
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Empowerment and the dark side of delegation
Kräkel, Matthias - 2018
The existing delegation literature has focused on different preferences of principal and agent concerning project selection, which makes delegating authority costly for the principal. This paper shows that delegation has a cost even when the preferences of principal and agent are exogenously...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011795221
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Should you allow your agent to become your competitor? : On non-compete agreements in employment contracts
Kräkel, Matthias (contributor); Sliwka, Dirk (contributor) - 2006
We discuss a principal-agent model in which the principal has the opportunity to include a non-compete agreement in the employment contract. We show that not imposing such an agreement can be beneficial for the principal as the possibility to leave the firm generates implicit incentives for the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003301668
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Should you allow your agent to become your competitor? : on non-compete agreements in employment contracts
Kräkel, Matthias; Sliwka, Dirk - 2006
We discuss a principal-agent model in which the principal has the opportunity to include a non-compete agreement in the employment contract. We show that not imposing such an agreement can be beneficial for the principal as the possibility to leave the firm generates implicit incentives for the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010371071
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Fixed Salary or Incentive Contract? The Effect of Stickiness of Compensation Contracts
Wakabayashi, Toshiaki - 2022
This study adopts behavioral contract theory through a mathematical model and clarifies the situation in which a fixed–salary contract is preferable to incentives–based one for the principal. Theoretically, the expected utility for the principal is higher under an incentives–based contract...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013296794
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Dynamic Contracting in Asset Management under Investor-Partner-Manager Relationship
Keppo, Jussi; Touzi, Nizar; Ruiting, Zuo - 2021
We study incentive contracts in asset management business under dynamic actions and relationships between an investor, a partner of an investment company, and a fund manager of the company. The investor cannot perfectly observe the partner and manager’s actions, and similarly, the partner...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013242101
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Social comparison and optimal contracts in competition for managerial talent
Ulrichshofer, Anna; Walzl, Markus - 2020
We analyze the impact of social comparison on optimal contract design under imperfect labor market competition for managerial talent. Adding a disutility of social comparison as induced by a ranking of verifiable efforts to the multi-task model by Bénabou and Tirole (2016), we demonstrate that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012253115
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Chapter 2. Aspects of the Economics of Organization with Application to Corporate Governance
Hermalin, Benjamin E. - 2017
This chapter provides a critical review and survey of aspects of formal and informal contracting particularly relevant to the study of corporate governance. Two types of modeling, hidden-information agency and informal (relational) contracting that are perhaps under-utilized in governance...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014023373
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On social identity, subjective expectations, and the costs of control
Riener, Gerhard; Wiederhold, Simon - 2011
principal-agent model of control that takes into account social identity (in the sense of Akerlof and Kranton, 2000, 2005). From … the model and previous literature, we conclude that a shared social identity between the principal and agent has both a … conjectures in a labor market experiment with perfect monitoring. Our ndings confirm that social identity has important …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010286485