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Minimum payments and induced effort in moral hazard problems
Kadan, Ohad; Swinkels, Jeroen M. - In: Games and economic behavior 82 (2013), pp. 468-489
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010243689
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On the moral hazard problem without the first-order approach
Kadan, Ohad; Swinkels, Jeroen M. - In: Journal of economic theory 148 (2013) 6, pp. 2313-2343
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010257931
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Existence of optimal mechanisms in principal-agent problems
Kadan, Ohad; Reny, Philip J.; Swinkels, Jeroen M. - In: Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an … 85 (2017) 3, pp. 769-823
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011778813
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Existence of Optimal Mechanisms in Principal-Agent Problems
Kadan, Ohad; Reny, Philip; Swinkels, Jeroen - 2012
We provide general conditions under which principal-agent problems admit mechanisms that are optimal for the principal. Our result covers as special cases those in which the agent has no private information - i.e., pure moral hazard - as well as those in which the agent's only action is a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014186614