Similar Search Results

Information revelation and coordination using cheap talk in a game with two-sided private information

Ganguly, Chirantan; Ray, Indrajit - 2017

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012814158

Goeree, Jacob K.; Zhang, Jingjing - 2012

findings highlight the fragility of cheap-talk communication and may serve as a guide to refine existing behavioral theories …Charness and Dufwenberg (American Economic Review, June 2011, 1211-1237) have recently demonstrated that cheap-talk … communication raises efficiency in bilateral contracting situations with adverse selection. We replicate their finding and check its …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009742591

Delegating learning

Escobar, Juan F.; Zhang, Qiaoxi - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 2, pp. 571-603

Learning is crucial to organizational decision making but often needs to be delegated. We examine a dynamic delegation problem where a principal decides on a project with uncertain profitability. A biased agent, who is initially as uninformed as the principal, privately learns the profitability...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012587421

A principal-agent model of sequential testing

Gerardi, Dino; Maestri, Lucas Jóver - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 7 (2012) 3, pp. 425-463

This paper analyzes the optimal provision of incentives in a dynamic information acquisition process. In every period, the agent can acquire costly information that is relevant to the principal's decision. Each signal may or may not provide definitive evidence in favor of the good state. Neither...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011689319

Mechanism design with aftermarkets : on the impossibility of pure information intermediation

Dworczak, Piotr - 2016

A mediator, with no prior information and no control over the market protocol, attempts to redesign the information structure in the market by running an information intermediation mechanism with transfers that first elicits information from an agent, and then discloses information to another...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011865067