We consider repeated games with private monitoring that are .close. to repeated games with public/perfect monitoring. A private monitoring information structure is close to a public monitoring information structure when private signals can generate approximately the same distribution of the...

For repeated games with noisy private monitoring and communication, we examine robustness of perfect public equilibrium/subgame perfect equilibrium when private monitoring is "close" to some public monitoring. Private monitoring is "close" to public monitoring if the private signals can generate...

A repeated game with private monitoring is “close” to a repeated game with public monitoring (or perfect monitoring) when (i) the expected payoff structures are close and (ii) the informational structures are close in the sense that private signals in the private monitoring game can be...

We extend the folk theorem of repeated games to two settings in which players' information about others' play arrives with stochastic lags. In our first model, signals are almost-perfect if and when they do arrive, that is, each player either observes an almost-perfect signal of period-t play...

We prove a folk theorem for stochastic games with private, almost-perfect monitoring and observable states when the limit set of feasible and individually rational payoffs is independent of the state. This asymptotic state independence holds, for example, for irreducible stochastic games. Our...