Similar Search Results

Can the private sector ensure the public interest? : evidence from federal procurement

Giuffrida, Leonardo M.; Rovigatti, Gabriele - 2018

We empirically investigate the effect of procurement oversight on contract outcomes. In particular, we stress a distinction between public and private oversight: the former is a set of bureaucratic checks enacted by contracting offices, while the latter is carried out by private insurance...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011918341

Optimal procurement contracts with pre-project planning

Krähmer, Daniel; Strausz, Roland - 2010

hazard. To model the procurer's roblem, we extend a standard sequential screening model to endogenous information acquisition … with moral hazard. The optimal contract displays systematic distortions in information acquisition. Due to a rent effect …, adverse selection induces too much information acquisition to prevent cost overruns and too little information acquisition to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003935679

Optimal Procurement and Investment in New Technologies under Uncertainty

Arve, Malin - 2014

We study a buyer's optimal investment strategy for new technologies when costs evolve stochastically and are private information to the suppliers. In a continuous time setting, we show how the asymmetric information on the stochastic variables leads to delays in investment compared to the real...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013050326

Precontractual Investment and Modes of Procurement

De Chiara, Alessandro - 2018

Consider a repeated game in which a buyer must decide whether to procure goods whose design may prove defective through auctions or negotiations. To reduce the likelihood of failure, the buyer must motivate the potential suppliers to make a precontractual investment. Because the noisy signal of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012928230

Supply contracting under dynamic asymmetric cost informationl

Di Corato, Luca; Moretto, Michele - 2024

We consider a long-term contractual relationship in which a buyer procures a fixed quantity of a product from a supplier and then sells it on the market. The production cost is private information and evolves randomly over time. The solution to this dynamic principal-agent problem involves a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014478916

Trust and trustworthiness in procurement contracts with retainage

Walker, Matthew J.; Katok, Elena; Shachat, Jason M. - 2020

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012419117

Competitive procurement with ex post moral hazard

Chakraborty, Indranil; Khalil, Fahad; Lawarrée, Jacques - 2021

Unlike standard auctions, we show that competitive procurement may optimally limit competition or use inefficient allocation rules that award the project to a less efficient firm with positive probability. Procurement projects often involve ex post moral hazard after the competitive process is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012421254

Chapter 12 Incentive models of the defense procurement process

Rogerson, William P. - In: Handbook of defense economics : volume 1, (pp. 309-346). 1995

Economic theorists have devoted considerable attention to analyzing models of closely related incentive contracting problems that arise in the study of public procurement, private procurement, regulation, the theory of the firm, the theory of organizations, and managerial compensation. The...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014024419

Trust and trustworthiness in procurement contracts with retainage

Walker, Matthew J.; Katok, Elena; Shachat, Jason M. - In: Management science : journal of the Institute for … 69 (2023) 6, pp. 3492-3515

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014305733

Nonparametric identification of a contract model with adverse selection and moral hazard

Perrigne, Isabelle; Vuong, Quang H. - In: Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an … 79 (2011) 5, pp. 1499-1539

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009376274

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Next
Last