This paper reviews the Hotelling literature of product differentiation. The purpose of this work is to examine the impact of the market structure on price competitionand equilibrium differentiation. The existence of a general ’principle of differentiation’ is rejected. In contrast,...

In many cases, collusive agreements are formed by asymmetric firms and include only a subset of the firms active in the cartelized industry. This paper endogenizes the process of cartel formation in a numeric simulation model where firms differ in marginal costs and production technologies. The...

The paper proves the existence of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in a vertically differentiated duopoly with uncovered market, for a large set of symmetric and asymmetric distributions of consumers, including, among others, all logconcave distributions. The proof relies on the 'income share...

We provide a theory that unifies the long tail and blockbuster phenomena. Specifically, we analyze a three-stage game where, first, a large number of potential firms make entry decisions, then those who stay in the market decide on the investment in its product, and lastly customers with...

We analyze a Hotelling location-then-price duopoly game under demand uncertainty with uniformly distributed consumers in a standard quadratic costs scenario. The novelty of our approach consists of assuming that firms' beliefs are represented by non-extreme-outcome-additive (neo-additive)...

In many cases, collusive agreements are formed by asymmetric firms and include only a subset of the firms active in the cartelized industry. This paper endogenizes the process of cartel formation in a numeric simulation model where firms differ in marginal costs and production technologies. The...

Vertical mergers within a multi-echelon market result in equilibrium price changes, for wholesalers and retailers, alike. They may also impact the product variety that is available to the consumer, i.e., the equilibrium product assortment sold in the market. In this paper, we consider the...

The paper proves the existence of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in a vertically differentiated duopoly with uncovered market, for a large set of symmetric and asymmetric distributions of consumers, including, among others, all logconcave distributions. The proof relies on the 'income share...

In spatial competition iuml;B01rms are likely to be uncertain about consumer locations when launching products either because of shifting demographics or of asymmetric information about preferences. Realistically distributions of consumer locations should be allowed to vary over states and need...

We analyze a duopoly game in which products are initially differentiated in variety and quality. Each consumer has a most preferred variety and a quality valuation. Customization provides ideal varieties but has no effect on product qualities. The firms first choose whether to customize their...