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rationalizable implementation. Set-monotonicity is much weaker than Maskin monotonicity, which is the key condition for Nash … implementation and which also had been shown to be necessary for rationalizable implementation of social choice functions. Set …-monotonicity reduces to Maskin monotonicity in the case of functions. We conclude that the conditions for rationalizable implementation are …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011483605
for practical implementation mechanisms …We perform an experimental test of a modification of the controversial canonical mechanism for Nash implementation … feasibility of such implementation. In addition, the performance is further improved by imposing a fine on a dissident, so that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014220848
alternatives on individuals’ mechanism choices in such group choice situations. While efficient mechanisms are desirable, we … experimentally show that participation constraints can prevent their implementation. We find strong indications that individual …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011570166
In this note, three major areas of Buchanan's research are briefly described: (1) The ideas of Knut Wicksell on Buchanan's work, (2) constitutional economics and the veil of ignorance, and (3) the role of government and/or the power to tax. It is shown that these three areas had a major...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010208986
Consider the following principle regarding the performance of collective choice rules. "If a rule selects alternative x in situation 1, and alternative y in situation 2, there must be an alternative z, and some member of society whose appreciation of z relative to x has increased when going from...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013226894
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012405426
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012433571
In a model where cooperation is beneficial, but subject to cheating, and is supported by trigger strategy punishments in a repeated game, we explore the relationship between the nature of cooperation (size and composition of coalitions) and underlying inequality in the distribution of private...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011520520
We introduce a democratic procedure with voting-based proposals called ”Pendular Voting”. It works as follows: An agenda-setter chooses a proposal meant to replace a given status quo. In the first stage, a random sample of the population votes on the proposal. The result is made public,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013223041
This paper considers collective decision-making when individuals are partitioned into groups (e.g., states or parties) endowed with voting weights. We study a game in which each group chooses an internal rule that specifies the allocation of its weight to the alternatives as a function of its...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012024746