We develop a dynamic model in which a group collectively bargains with an external party. At each date the group makes an offer to the external party (the 'agent') in exchange for a concession. Group members hold heterogeneous preferences over agreements and are uncertain about the agent's...

We often use delegation as a commitment device if a government faces problems of timeinconsistency. McCallum (1995, AER P&P) challenged this practice, claiming that delegation merely relocates the commitment problem but does not solve it. In a model where delegation and specific policies are...

We study legislative bargaining with two person teams versus individuals. Teams pass minimum winning coalitions significantly more often than individuals, meeting or beating the demanding truth wins criteria. Teams have more proposer power, coming significantly closer to the very unequal payoffs...

Florian Dorn erstellte diesen Beitrag während seines Promotionsstudiums an der Universität München (LMU). Die Studie wurde im September 2020 abgeschlossen und von der Fakultät für Volkswirtschaftslehre als Dissertation angenommen. Die Dissertation trägt zur Empirie der Ökonomie des...

In this paper we investigate the role of judicial control of lobbying activities in an endogenous policy framework, focusing on two dimensions of quality of the judiciary, namely efficiency and integrity. We present a multi-layer lobbying model where a self-interested group is allowed to inuence...

With the end of China’s 11th Five-Year Plan approaching, this paper analyzes sub-national governments' implementation strategies to meet national energy efficiency targets. Previous research focuses on the way governance practices and decision-making structures shape implementation outcomes,...

The application and design of public-private partnerships between the extremes of purely public or purely private task fulfilment in public services is, in practice, subject to political processes. Decisions about PPPs (realisation, arrangement) are taken in the political arena and are therefore...

The accuracy of a tax return is usually interpreted as an outcome of the tax evasion decision by an individual. However, in non-democratic regimes with predatory blackmail tax systems it is possible that large sums voluntarily reported by influential politicians or businessmen may be used as...

Regulation regimes subject to the influence of interest groups are compared. It is shown that the allocation of the regulated commodity varies with the implemented control and that the advantage of prices (vs. quotas) increases with the elasticity of the demand for or the supply of the commodity...

In this paper we investigate the role of judicial control of lobbying activities in an endogenous policy framework, focusing on two dimensions of quality of the judiciary, namely efficiency and integrity. We present a multi-layer lobbying model where a self-interested group is allowed to...