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The conservative equal costs rule, the serial cost sharing rule and the pivotal mechanism : asymptotic welfare loss comparisons for the case of an excludable public project

Deb, Rajat; Razzolini, Laura; Seo, Tae-kun - In: Review of economic design : RED 10 (2006) 3, pp. 205-232

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003411839

Strategy-proofness and public good provision using referenda based on unequal cost sharing

Deb, Rajat; Seo, Tae-kun - In: International journal of game theory : official journal … 39 (2010) 1/2, pp. 223-236

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003948180

Welfare asymptotics of the pivotal mechanism for excludable public goods

Deb, Rajat; Ghosh, Indranil; Seo, Tae-kun - In: Mathematical social sciences 43 (2002) 2, pp. 209-224

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001705335

Strategy-proof and individually rational social choice functions for public good economies: a note

Deb, Rajat; Ohseto, Shinji - In: Economic theory : official journal of the Society for … 14 (1999) 3, pp. 685-689

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001455344

Maximal surplus from the pivotal mechanism : a closed form solution

Deb, Rajat - In: Review of economic design : RED 3 (1998) 4, pp. 347-357

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001251825

Auction-like mechanisms for pricing excludable public goods

Deb, Rajat; Razzolini, Laura - In: Journal of economic theory 88 (1999) 2, pp. 340-368

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001418600

Voluntary cost sharing for an excludable public project

Deb, Rajat; Razzolini, Laura - In: Mathematical social sciences 37 (1999) 2, pp. 123-138

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001398134

Strategy-proof cost sharing, ability pay and free provision of an indivisible public good

Deb, Rajat; Razzolini, Laura; Seo, Tae-kun - In: Mathematical social sciences 45 (2003) 2, pp. 205-227

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001755848

Referenda and the provision of a binary public good

Deb, Rajat; Ghosh, Indranil; Seo, Tae-kun - In: Journal of mathematical finance 8 (2018) 4, pp. 668-689

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012016543

Strategy-Proof and Individually Rational Social Choice Functions for Public Good Economies : A Note

Deb, Rajat; Ohseto, Shinji - 2000

Serizawa [3] characterized the set of strategy-proof, individually rational, no exploitative, and non-bossy social choice functions in economies with pure public goods. He left an open question whether non-bossiness is necessary for his characterization. We will prove that non-bossiness is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014179633