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Multistage information transmission with voluntary monetary transfer
Sadakane, Hiroshi - 2017
We examine multistage information transmission with voluntary monetary transfer in the framework of Crawford and Sobel (1982). In our model, an informed expert can send messages to an uninformed decision maker more than once, and the uninformed decision maker can pay money to the informed expert...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011671657
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Optimal information disclosure : a linear programming approach
Kolotilin, Anton - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 13 (2018) 2, pp. 607-635
An uninformed sender designs a mechanism that discloses information about her type to a privately informed receiver, who then decides whether to act. I impose a single-crossing assumption, so that the receiver with a higher type is more willing to act. Using a linear programming approach, I...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011856702
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Spin doctors : an experiment on vague disclosure
Deversi, Marvin; Ispano, Alessandro; Schwardmann, Peter - 2021
Unfavorable news are often delivered under the disguise of vagueness. Our theory-driven laboratory experiment investigates this strategic use of vagueness in voluntary disclosure and asks whether there is scope for policy to improve information transmission. We find that vagueness is profitably...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013191455
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Optimal Strategic Communication : Can a Less Informed Expert Be More Informative?
Ivanov, Maxim G. - 2006
This paper investigates an extended version of Crawford-Sobel's (1982) communication game in which the principal can …-Sobel's most informative equilibrium and optimal delegation. We then study multi-stage communication. This modification results in … truth-telling communication at every stage. Finally, we construct a mechanism in which approximately full information is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014059602
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Strategic Communication under Persuasion Bias in Social Networks
Foerster, Manuel - 2015
We investigate the role of conflicting interests in a boundedly rational model of belief dynamics. Individuals have different preferences about the action to take, are subject to persuasion bias and repeatedly communicate with their neighbors in a social network. They communicate strategically...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014135492
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Voluntary Disclosure of Information and Cooperation in Simultaneous-Move Economic Interactions
Kamei, Kenju - 2020
This paper experimentally studies individuals' voluntary disclosure of past behaviors and its effects in a finitely repeated two-player public goods game. The experiment data found that voluntary information disclosure strengthens cooperation under certain conditions, although a non-negligible...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012843470
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Does Voluntary Disclosure of Polarizing Information Make Polarization Deeper? An Online Experiment on Russo-Ukrainian War
Chapkovski, Philipp; Zakharov, Alexei - 2023
Does the animosity toward a holder of an opposite political opinion or the behavior toward someone whose opinion on a divisive issue is unknown depends on whether that opinion was disclosed or withheld voluntarily? In order to study this question, we conducted a pre-registered study in Russia,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014257577
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Voluntary Disclosure in Asymmetric Contests
Ewerhart, Christian; Lareida, Julia - 2021
Pareto inferior unraveling, the favorite may prefer to shut down communication, but this is never the case for the underdog …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013251018
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Voluntary disclosure in unfair contests
Ewerhart, Christian; Lareida, Julia - 2021 - Revised version
Pareto inferior unraveling, the favorite may prefer to shut down communication, but this is never the case for the underdog …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012420336
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Voluntary disclosure in asymmetric contests
Ewerhart, Christian; Lareida, Julia - 2023 - Revised version, July 2023
This paper studies the incentives for interim voluntary disclosure of verifiable information in probabilistic all-pay contests with two-sided incomplete information. Private information may concern marginal cost, valuations, and ability. Our main result says that, if the contest is uniformly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014321141