The paper studies the decision of firms to expense or capitalize R&D. In a two-period model, a monopolist decides on how much to invest in R&D and how much of that investment to capitalize, and then on each period's output. It is found that the firm has an incentive to mismatch the benefits and...

The precompetitive R&D literature has viewed cooperative and noncooperative R&D as substitutes. In this paper a more realistic approach is taken, where both cooperative and noncooperative R&D are performed in parallel. In the first stage firms determine the optimal investments in both types of...

The paper explores the role of R&D investments reducing fixed production costs in entry deterrence. An incumbent monopolist performs R&D to reduce its fixed production costs. There is a potential entrant, which can also perform R&D for the same purpose. There are bidirectional technological...

This paper proposes a model where firms invest in secrecy to limit technological spillovers accruing to their competitors, in addition to investing in cost-reducing R&D. The main result of the paper is that increases in spillovers increase secrecy, suggesting that legal and strategic protection...