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Reputation in perturbed repeated games

Cripps, Martin; Schmidt, Klaus M.; Thomas, Jonathan P. - 1993

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000869685

Reputation and commitment in two-person repeated games

Cripps, Martin; Thomas, Jonathan P. - 1992

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000836995

Cooperation and punishment

Evans, Robert A.; Thomas, Jonathan P. - In: Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an … 69 (2001) 4, pp. 1061-1075

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001594739

Reputation and perfection in repeated common interest games

Cripps, Martin - In: Games and economic behavior 18 (1997) 2, pp. 141-158

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001218187

Reputation in perturbed repeated games

Cripps, Martin - In: Journal of economic theory 69 (1996) 2, pp. 387-410

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001200111

Reputation and commitment in two-person repeated games without discounting

Cripps, Martin - In: Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an … 63 (1995) 6, pp. 1401-1419

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001188995

Some Asymptotic Results in Discounted Repeated Games of One-Sided Incomplete Information

Cripps, Martin W.; Thomas, Jonathan - School of Economics, University of Edinburgh - 2004

The paper analyzes the Nash equilibria of two-person discounted repeated games with one-sided incomplete information and known own payo®s. If the informed player is arbitrarily patient relative to the uninformed player, then the characterization for the informed player's payoffs is essentially...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005245992

Reputation in pertubed repeated games

Cripps, Martin; Scmidt, Klaus; Thomas, Jonathan - University of Bonn, Germany - 1993

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968157