We study how individuals’ willingness to delegate choice is affected by heterogeneity in identity between the delegee and the delegate. While it is straightforward that such heterogeneity can affect delegation for instrumental reasons, we show experimentally that divergent identity also causes...

We explore how the timings of compensation payment and contract termination are jointly and optimally determined in a continuous-time principal—agent model under the discretionary termination policy of investors (the principal) when the agent has loss—averse preferences. Our theoretical...

In this paper, we adapt a continuous-time agency model to incorporate the loss-aversion preferences of agents. To this end, by distinguishing between the gains in capital and income driven by variations in the agent's continuation payoff, we provide a theoretical model which overcomes the...

We present results from a laboratory study of loss aversion in the context of intertemporal choice. We investigate whether the provision of (windfall) endowments results in different elicited discount rates relative to subjects who earn income or earn and retain the income for a period before...

We investigate whether there is a link between conditional cooperation and betrayal aversion. We use a public goods game to classify subjects by type of contribution preference and by belief about the contributions of others; and we measure betrayal aversion for different categories of subject....

We investigate whether there is a link between conditional cooperation and betrayal aversion. We use a public goods game to classify subjects by type of contribution preference and by belief about the contributions of others; and we measure betrayal aversion for different categories of subject....

We investigate whether there is a link between conditional cooperation and betrayal aversion. We use a public goods game to classify subjects by type of contribution preference and by belief about the contributions of others; and we measure betrayal aversion for different categories of subject....

A substantive body of research highlights the existence of framing effects in labour supply responses to taxation challenging traditional models that assume taxes only influence behaviour via the budget constraint. Using a lab experiment, this paper examines the presence of differential...

Starting from Schelling (1960), several game theorists have conjectured that payoff equity might facilitate coordination in normal-form games with multiple equilibria - the more equitable equilibrium might be selected either because fairness makes it focal or because many individuals dislike...