Using a news-based index of aggregate policy uncertainty in the US economy, we document a strong negative relation between policy uncertainty and corporate risk-taking. We show that high levels of policy uncertainty are associated with significantly lower future stock return volatility at the...

Coordination problems amongst creditors are reduced when a firm's debt structure is concentrated in fewer debt types. Using a sample of US non-financial firms, we show that an increase in risk-taking incentives in CEO pay is associated with a greater debt concentration by debt type. This result...

We provide evidence concerning the effect of managerial risk-taking incentives on merger and acquisition (M&A) decisions and outcomes for different types of mergers: vertical, horizontal, and diversifying. Using chief executive officer (CEO) relative inside leverage to proxy for the incentives...

Incentive schemes not only influence the effort provision of workers, but might also induce sorting. As drivers of self-selection, the literature mainly focuses on measures of productivity; however, other variables, such as preferences, beliefs and personality, also play a role. With this paper,...

This paper studies the impact of incentives on worker self-selection in a controlled laboratory experiment. In a first step we elicit subjects' productivity levels. Subjects then face the choice between a fixed or a variable payment scheme. Depending on the treatment, the variable payment is...

This study examines gender differences in risk-taking behavior among managers in a female-dominated industry. Using data from international top-level women's soccer, we provide evidence that male coaches show a lower level of risk-taking than female coaches on average. We also find a U-shaped...

The, often observed, positive correlation between incentive intensity and risk has been explained in two ways: the presence of transaction costs as determinants of contracts and the sorting of risk-tolerant individuals into firms using high-intensity incentive contracts. The empirical importance...

In dieser Arbeit untersuchen wir Höhe und Struktur der Vergütung von Fondsmanagern und erklären diese durch Eigenschaften des Arbeitnehmers, des Arbeitgebers und des Arbeitsplatzes. Insgesamt verdienen deutsche Fondsmanager weniger als ihre merikanischen Kollegen. Die Vergütungshöhe hängt...

This paper shows that bonus contracts may arise endogenously as a response to agency problems within banks, and analyzes how compensation schemes change in reaction to anticipated bail-outs. If there is a risk-shifting problem, bail-out expectations lead to steeper bonus schemes and even more...

A main prediction of agency theory is the well known risk-incentive trade-off. Incentive contracts should be found in environments with little uncertainty and for agents with low degrees of risk aversion. There is an ongoing debate in the literature about the first trade-off. Due to lack of...