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Optimal selling mechanisms under moment conditions

Carrasco, Vinicius; Luz, Vitor Farinha; Kos, Nenad; … - In: Journal of economic theory 177 (2018), pp. 245-279

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012025700

Selling to the mean

Kos, Nenad; Messner, Matthias - 2015 - This version: June 19, 2015

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011809364

Markets and transaction costs

Jantschgi, Simon; Nax, Heinrich H.; Pradelski, Bary S. R.; … - 2022

properties of markets without transaction costs, namely strategyproofness, efficiency, and robustness to misspecified beliefs and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013441509

Markets and transaction costs

Jantschgi, Simon; Nax, Heinrich H.; Pradelski, Bary S. R.; … - 2022 - Revised version, September 2022

properties of markets without transaction costs, namely strategyproofness, efficiency, and robustness to misspecified beliefs and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013440142

Uncertain rationality, depth of reasoning and robustness in games with incomplete information

Germano, Fabrizio; Weinstein, Jonathan; Zuazo-Garin, Peio - In: Theoretical Economics 15 (2020) 1, pp. 89-122

Predictions under common knowledge of payoffs may differ from those under arbitrarily, but finitely, many orders of mutual knowledge; Rubinstein's (1989)Email game is a seminal example. Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) showed that the discontinuity in the example generalizes: for all types with...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012215306

Uncertain rationality, depth of reasoning and robustness in games with incomplete information

Germano, Fabrizio; Weinstein, Jonathan; Zuazo-Garin, Peio - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 15 (2020) 1, pp. 89-122

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012159030

Informational Smallness and Privae Momnitoring in Repeated Games, Second Version

McLean, Richard; Obara, Ichiro; Postlewaite, Andrew - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2005

We consider repeated games with private monitoring that are .close. to repeated games with public/perfect monitoring. A private monitoring information structure is close to a public monitoring information structure when private signals can generate approximately the same distribution of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009293082

Generalized Potentials and Robust Sets of Equilibria

Morris, Stephen; Ui, Takashi - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2003

This paper introduces generalized potential functions of complete information games and studies the robustness of sets … behavior close to some equilibrium in the set. This paper provides sufficient conditions for the robustness of sets of … existing sufficient conditions for the robustness of equilibria. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762463

Robustness of Bayesian Equilibria

Stauber, Ronald - Econometric Society - 2004

knowledge prior on preference parameters. I analyze the robustness of equilibria of such games to perturbations in the … of his higher order beliefs. Based on this definition of an $\varepsilon$-equilibrium, I propose a notion of robustness …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005130188

Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games

McLean, Richard; Obara, Ichiro; Postlewaite, Andrew - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2001

For repeated games with noisy private monitoring and communication, we examine robustness of perfect public equilibrium … a uniform folk theorem with public monitoring which, combined with our robustness result, yields a new folk theorem for …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005109614

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