Similar Search Results

Selling to the mean

Kos, Nenad; Messner, Matthias - 2015 - This version: June 19, 2015

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011809364

Optimal selling mechanisms under moment conditions

Carrasco, Vinicius; Luz, Vitor Farinha; Kos, Nenad; … - In: Journal of economic theory 177 (2018), pp. 245-279

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012025700

Markets and transaction costs

Jantschgi, Simon; Nax, Heinrich H.; Pradelski, Bary S. R.; … - 2022

properties of markets without transaction costs, namely strategyproofness, efficiency, and robustness to misspecified beliefs and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013441509

Markets and transaction costs

Jantschgi, Simon; Nax, Heinrich H.; Pradelski, Bary S. R.; … - 2022 - Revised version, September 2022

properties of markets without transaction costs, namely strategyproofness, efficiency, and robustness to misspecified beliefs and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013440142

Uncertain rationality, depth of reasoning and robustness in games with incomplete information

Germano, Fabrizio; Weinstein, Jonathan; Zuazo-Garin, Peio - In: Theoretical Economics 15 (2020) 1, pp. 89-122

Predictions under common knowledge of payoffs may differ from those under arbitrarily, but finitely, many orders of mutual knowledge; Rubinstein's (1989)Email game is a seminal example. Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) showed that the discontinuity in the example generalizes: for all types with...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012215306

Uncertain rationality and robustness in games with incomplete information

Germano, Fabrizio; Zuazo-Garin, Peio - Department of Economics and Business, Universitat … - 2015

rationalizable (ICR) actions, are robust to higher-order belief misspecifications. This paper extends their robustness analysis to … solution concept for games with incomplete information. We first confirm the robustness of the ICR predictions to small …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011195695

Coordination failure in repeated games with private monitoring

Sugaya, Takuo; Takahashi, Satoru - In: Journal of Economic Theory 148 (2013) 5, pp. 1891-1928

Players coordinate continuation play in repeated games with public monitoring. We investigate the robustness of such … robustness is sensitive to whether we allow for uninterpretable signals. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011043043

Robustness of public equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring

McLean, Richard; Obara, Ichiro; Postlewaite, Andrew - In: Journal of Economic Theory 153 (2014) C, pp. 191-212

A repeated game with private monitoring is “close” to a repeated game with public monitoring (or perfect monitoring) when (i) the expected payoff structures are close and (ii) the informational structures are close in the sense that private signals in the private monitoring game can be...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011043051

Saddle functions and robust sets of equilibria

Nora, Vladyslav; Uno, Hiroshi - In: Journal of Economic Theory 150 (2014) C, pp. 866-877

We provide a new sufficient condition for the robustness of sets of equilibria to incomplete information in the sense …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010743795

Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games

McLean, Richard; Obara, Ichiro; Postlewaite, Andrew - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2001

For repeated games with noisy private monitoring and communication, we examine robustness of perfect public equilibrium … a uniform folk theorem with public monitoring which, combined with our robustness result, yields a new folk theorem for …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005109614