This article considers the possibility of simultaneously reducing crime, prison sentences, and the tax burden of financing the criminal justice system by introducing positive sanctions, which are benefits conferred to non-convicts. Specifically, it proposes a procedure wherein a part of the...

Reputational sanctions and stigmatization costs share many things in common. In particular, wage reductions in the labor market caused by stigmatization (Rasmusen (1996)), and profit reductions in commercial markets caused by reputational losses due to a firm's previous wrong-doings (Iacobucci...

This article shows that moderate regulatory sanctions can generate subtle problems not apparent in simple enforcement models. Assuming that firms may ultimately face different noncompliance detection probabilities, we highlight that moderate sanctions may conflict with aspects of both static and...

The literature on law enforcement often assumes that the updating of beliefs regarding the probability of detection is a process that is independent from the severity of the sanction. We test this presumption experimentally, using a taking game in which the probability of detection may be either...

Punishment causes reputational losses in addition to more tangible losses. Lowering the probability of punishment reduces these reputational losses by diluting the informational value of verdicts. These considerations better align the positive as well as normative implications of law enforcement...