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The value of signals in hidden action models : concepts, application, and empirical evidence : with 9 tables
Schnedler, Wendelin - 2004
What happens if A wants to buy a good or service from B, but not all relevant characteristics can be fixed in a contract? This book gives a non-technical overview of various models dealing with this situation. Particular emphasis is put on the problem that the service includes various tasks and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001880273
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The Value of Signals in Hidden Action Models : Concepts, Application, and Empirical Evidence
Schnedler, Wendelin - 2004
What happens if A wants to buy a good or service from B, but not all relevant characteristics can be fixed in a contract? This book gives a non-technical overview of various models dealing with this situation. Particular emphasis is put on the problem that the service includes various tasks and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013519359
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Why do temporary help firms provide free general skills training?
Autor, David H. - In: The quarterly journal of economics 116 (2001) 4, pp. 1409-1448
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001638717
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Why do temporary help firms provide free general skills training?
Autor, David H. - 2000
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001468364
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Why do firms train? : Theory and evidence
Acemoglu, Daron - In: The quarterly journal of economics 113 (1998) 1, pp. 79-119
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001236715
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Why do temporary help firms provide free general skills training?
Autor, David H. (contributor) - 2001 - [Elektronische Ressource]
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001565081
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Why Do Firms Train? Theory and Evidence
Acemoglu, Daron - 1996
This paper offers and tests a theory of training whereby workers do not pay for general training they receive. The … other firms. This informational advantage gives the employer an ex post monopsony power over the worker which encourages the … high, and as a result employers have limited monopsony power and are willing to supply only little training, while in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012473240
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Why Do Firms Train? Theory and Evidence
Acemoglu, Daron; Pischke, Jörn-Steffen - 2021
This paper offers and tests a theory of training whereby workers do not pay for general training they receive. The … other firms. This informational advantage gives the employer an ex post monopsony power over the worker which encourages the … high, and as a result employers have limited monopsony power and are willing to supply only little training, while in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013231422
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Efficient bargaining and the skill-structure of wages and employment
Kaiser, Ulrich - 2000
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014378823
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Efficient bargaining and the skill-structure of wages and employment
Kaiser, Ulrich; Pohlmeier, Winfried - 2000
This paper presents structural estimates for a bargaining model which nests the right-to-manage, the efficient wage bargaining, the seniority and the standard neoclassical labor demand model as special cases. In contrast to most existing models, our approach accounts for heterogeneous skill...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011544363