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Cartel Duration and Endogenous Private Monitoring and Communication: An Instrumental Variables Approach
Zhou, Jun - 2012
Colluding firms often exchange private information and make transfers within the cartels based on the information. Estimating the impact of such collusive practices'€" known as the 'lysine strategy profile (LSP)€'€" on cartel duration is difficult because of endogeneity and omitted...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333795
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Is Seniority-Based Pay Used as a Motivation Device? : Evidence from Plant Level Data
Bayo-Moriones, Alberto; Galdon-Sanchez, José Enrique; … - 2004
monitoring devices and piece-rates. We find that firms that offer seniority-based pay are less likely to offer explicit … incentives. They are also less likely to invest in monitoring devices. We also find that firms that offer seniority-based pay are …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010273743
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Efficiency Wages and Effort: Are Hard Jobs Better?
Strobl, Eric; Walsh, Frank A. - 2003
Efficiency wage theory predicts that the wage per unit of effort will be lower in intensively monitored sectors. This wage differential will increase in effort. Using employer-employee matched data from Ghana we provide evidence supporting this hypothesis.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010277068
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Monitoring, information technology and the labor share
Schneider, Dorothee - 2011
Communication Technology) reduce the labor share in OECD countries by improving the monitoring technology. In a first step, I show … a simulation of the model of Bental and Demougin (2010). In a second approach, I confirm increasing monitoring of … foreign work, but also through to lowering rents of workers as monitoring technology improves. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281595
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The role of sickness in the evaluation of job search assistance and sanctions
van den Berg, Gerard J.; Hofmann, Barbara; Uhlendorff, Arne - 2016
Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However, the possibility to report sick creates an additional moral hazard, since during sickness spells, minimum requirements on search behavior do not apply. This reduces the ex ante...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011531724
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The economics of bank supervision
Eisenbach, Thomas M.; Lucca, David O.; Townsend, Robert M. - 2016
We study bank supervision by combining a theoretical model that distinguishes supervision from regulation and a novel dataset on work hours of Federal Reserve supervisors. We highlight the trade-offs between the benefits and costs of supervision and use the model to interpret the relationship...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011537999
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Cartel duration and endogenous private monitoring and communication : an instrumental variables approach
Zhou, Jun - 2012
Colluding firms often exchange private information and make transfers within the cartels based on the information. Estimating the impact of such collusive practices" - known as the 'lysine strategy profile (LSP)" - on cartel duration is difficult because of endogeneity and omitted variable bias....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009571067
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The role of sickness in the evaluation of job search assistance and sanctions
Berg, Gerard J. van den; Hofmann, Barbara; Uhlendorff, Arne - 2016
Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However, the possibility to report sick creates an additional moral hazard, since during sickness spells, minimum requirements on search behavior do not apply. This reduces the ex ante...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011418245
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The economics of bank supervision
Eisenbach, Thomas M.; Lucca, David O.; Townsend, Robert M. - 2016
We study bank supervision by combining a theoretical model that distinguishes supervision from regulation and a novel dataset on work hours of Federal Reserve supervisors. We highlight the trade-offs between the benefits and costs of supervision and use the model to interpret the relationship...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011442183
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The role of sickness in the evaluation of job search assistance and sanctions
Berg, Gerard J. van den; Hofmann, Barbara; Uhlendorff, Arne - 2016
Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However, the possibility to report sick creates an additional moral hazard, since during sickness spells, minimum requirements on search behavior do not apply. This reduces the ex ante...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011449662