The questions of whether there ever existed excessive risk-taking incentives from executive compensation in the financial industry, and whether top executives of financial services firms actually responded to such excessive incentives that eventually led to the crisis remain unanswered. The...

Das internationale Bankensystem stand in den vergangenen Jahren im Fokus des öffentlichen Interesses. Bei der Diskussion möglicher Optionen zur Verbesserung der Finanzsystemstabilität rückt zunehmend die Corporate Governance in Banken in den Fokus. Der vorliegende Forschungsbericht widmet...

We study CEO compensation in the banking industry by considering banks’ unique claim structure in the presence of two types of agency problems: the standard managerial agency problem and the risk-shifting problem between shareholders and debtholders. We empirically test two hypotheses derived...

We study CEO compensation in the banking industry by considering banks' unique claim structure in the presence of two types of agency problems: the standard managerial agency problem and the risk-shifting problem between shareholders and debt holders. We empirically test two hypotheses derived...

Das internationale Bankensystem stand in den vergangenen Jahren im Fokus des öffentlichen Interesses. Bei der Diskussion möglicher Optionen zur Verbesserung der Finanzsystemstabilität rückt zunehmend die Corporate Governance in Banken in den Fokus. Der vorliegende Forschungsbericht widmet...

Das internationale Bankensystem stand in den vergangenen Jahren im Fokus des öffentlichen Interesses. Bei der Diskussion möglicher Optionen zur Verbesserung der Finanzsystemstabilität rückt zunehmend die Corporate Governance in Banken in den Fokus. Der vorliegende Forschungsbericht widmet...

We investigate the suggested substitutive relation between executive compensation and the disciplinary threat of takeover imposed by the market for corporate control. We complement other empirical studies on managerial compensation and corporate control mechanisms in three distinct ways. First,...

Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) estimate that CEO pay decreases by 17% more in firms whose boards were not compliant with the recent NYSE/NASDAQ independence requirements than in firms that were compliant. We document that 65% of the magnitude is driven by a single outlier. All our attempts to...

Chhaochharia and Grinstein (JF, 2009) estimate that CEO pay decreases by 17% more in firms that were not compliant with the recent NYSE/NASDAQ board independence requirement than in firms that were compliant. We document that 74% of this magnitude is attributable to two outliers out of 865...

We examine the impact of acquisitions by UK acquirers on executive pay. The overall sample shows a significant transitory pay increase. Pay changes are not affected by target nationality or organizational form, although initial cross-border acquisitions result in higher pay. Pay increases are...