Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 5,446
Cover Image
Managerial incentive, organizational slack, and performance : empirical analysis of Japanese firms' behavior
Mizutani, Fumitoshi; Nakamura, Eri - In: Journal of management & governance 18 (2014) 1, pp. 245-284
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010340691
Cover Image
Estimating the sensitivity of CEO compensation to gross versus net accounting performance
Black, Dirk E.; Dikolli, Shane S.; Hofmann, Christian; … - In: Contemporary accounting research : the journal of the … 41 (2024) 1, pp. 255-291
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014517913
Cover Image
Complementarity and substitutability of managerial incentives : evidence from China's state-owned enterprises
Bai, Chong-En; Xu, Lixin Colin - 2000
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001546786
Cover Image
Do entrenched managers pay their workers more?
Cronqvist, Henrik; Heyman, Fredrik; Nilsson, Mattias; … - 2005
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003280603
Cover Image
Performance incentives within firms : the effect of managerial responsibility
Aggarwal, Raj; Samwick, Andrew - In: The journal of finance : the journal of the American … 58 (2003) 4, pp. 1613-1650
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001781171
Cover Image
Moral hazard, competition and contract design : empirical evidence from managerial, franchised and entrepreneurial businesses in Norway
Nygaard, Arne; Myrtveit, Ingunn - In: Applied economics 32 (2000) 3, pp. 349-356
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001489132
Cover Image
Performance incentives within firms : the effect of managerial responsibility
Aggarwal, Raj; Samwick, Andrew - 1999
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001415119
Cover Image
Managerial Incentives, Financial Constraints and Ownership Concentration
Protopapa, Marco - 2011
managers and shareholders upon the control of internal funds, a simple model allows to analyse the link between profit …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013125625
Cover Image
Incentive Contracts are Not Rigged by Powerful CEOs
Wan, Kam-Ming - 2014
Morse, Nanda and Seru (2011) interpret the data to suggest that more powerful CEOs ex-post change their incentive contracts more. My paper points out a number of issues with their inference. First and most importantly, MNS do not control for the fact that not just the most powerful but almost...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013065835
Cover Image
Performance Incentives Within Firms : The Effect of Managerial Responsibility
Aggarwal, Rajesh K. - 1999
executive officers. However, firms are run by teams of managers, and a theory of the firm should also explain the distribution …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471450