Social contacts help workers to find jobs, but those jobs need not be in the occupations where workers are most productive. Hence social contacts can generate mismatch between a worker's occupational choice and his comparative productive advantage. Thus economies with dense social networks can...

In a simple search model of money, we study a special kind of memory which gives rise to an arrangement resembling a payment network. Specifically, we assume that agents can choose to have access to a central data base which keeps track of payments made and received. We show that multiple...

I analyze the implications of moral hazard in dynamic economy with production. In particular, I add agency frictions to a benchmark stochastic growth model, by assuming that firms observe output but hours worked and productivity are unobservable. I cast the problem as a continuous time principal...

This paper extends Shimer's (2005) Mismatch model to allow for endogenous mobility. Rather than work directly in the original model, I use a related framework, the stock-flow matching model (Taylor, 1995; Coles and Muthoo, 1998). One of the contributions of this paper is therefore to compare the...

We introduce a joint model of labor market search and firm size dynamics to explain the differential in labor market and productivity outcomes between the U.S. and the European Union. At the core, our model is a hybrid of the labor market search model by Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) and the...

Through marriage, individuals can share some risks that would otherwise be uninsurable. In this paper, we ask how much idiosyncratic income risk can be diversified away through marriage contracts alone versus how much risk there remains for public unemployment insurance programs to alleviate. We...

This paper explores labor productivity growth in a Lentz and Mortensen (2005 a,b) model with labor market frictions

We study a multiperiod principal-agent problem with moral hazard in which the agent is required to exert effort only in the initial period of the contract. The effort choice of the agent in this first period determines the conditional distribution of output in the following periods. The paper...