This discussion paper led to a publication in 'TOP' (forthcoming).<P> In this paper we introduce and characterize two new values for transferable utility games with graph restricted communication and a priori unions. Both values are obtained by applying the Shapley value to an associated TU-game....</p>

One of the main issues in economics is the trade-off between marginalism and egalitarianism. In the context of cooperative games this trade-off can be framed as one of choosing to allocate according to the Shapley value or the equal division solution. In this paper we provide tools that make it...

A situation in which a finite set of agents can generate certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility (or simply a TU-game) where each agent is represented by one player in the game. In this paper, we assume that one agent can be represented by...

This discussion paper resulted in a publication in 'Mathematical Methods of Operations Research', 2013, 77, 1-14.<P> In this paper we provide new axiomatizations of the Shapley value for TU-games using axioms that are based on relational aspects in the interactions among players. Some of these...</p>

We introduce the prediction value (PV) as a measure of players’ informational importance in probabilistic TU games. The latter combine a standard TU game and a probability distribution over the set of coalitions. Player i’s prediction value equals the difference between the conditional...

We consider a cooperative game with a bipartition that indicates which players are participating. This paper provides an analytical solution for the Shapley value when the worth of a coalition only depends on the number of participating coalition players. The computational complexity grows...

This discussion paper resulted in a publication in 'Linear Algebra and its Applications', 2015, 471, 224-240.<P> Hamiache (2001) assigns to every TU game a so-called associated game and then shows that the Shapley value is characterized as the unique solution for TU games satisfying the inessential...</p>

We consider the problem of axiomatizing the Shapley value on the class of assignment games. We first show that several axiomatizations of the Shapley value on the class of all TU-games do not characterize this solution on the class of assignment games by providing alternative solutions that...

This discussion paper resulted in a publication in the 'Economic Theory', 2015, 58, 99-123.<P> In the literature various models of games with restricted cooperation can be found. In those models, instead of allowing for all subsets of the set of players to form, it is assumed that the set of...</p>

This discussion paper resulted in a publication in 'Games and Economic Behavior', 2012, 76, 344-348. <P> Three well-known solutions for cooperative TU-games are the Shapley value, the Banzhaf value and the equal division solution. In the literature various axiomatizations of these solutions can be...</p>