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We study the impact of accelerated vesting of equity awards on takeovers, whereby the restricted stock and/or stock options of the target CEO immediately vest and become unrestricted upon the close of the acquisition. We find that takeover premiums are significantly larger when the target CEO...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013117248
Using comprehensive financial and accounting data on China's listed firms from 1998 to 2002, augmented by unique data on CEO turnover, ownership structure and board characteristics, we estimate Logit models of CEO turnover. We find consistently for all performance measures including both stock...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003253453
Traditional stock option grant is the most common form of incentive pay in executive compensation. Applying a principal-agent analysis, we find this common practice suboptimal and firms are better off linking incentive pay to average stock prices. Among other benefits, averaging reduces...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013100690
In the wake of the backdating scandal, many firms began awarding options at scheduled times each year. Scheduling option grants eliminates backdating, but creates other agency problems. CEOs that know the dates of upcoming scheduled option grants have an incentive to temporarily depress stock...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013006948
Using the details of vesting terms, we document that stock options granted in high sentiment periods tend to have shorter vesting period/duration, and are more likely to vest completely or have a significantly larger fraction vested within one year of the grant date relative to low sentiment...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012856228
Using the details of vesting terms, we document that stock options granted in high investor sentiment periods tend to have shorter vesting periods and durations, and are more likely to vest completely or have a significantly larger fraction vested within one year of the grant date, relative to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013246732
Traditional stock option grant is the most common form of incentive pay in executive compensation. Applying a principal-agent analysis, we find this common practice suboptimal and firms are better off linking incentive pay to average stock prices. Holding the cost of the option grant to the firm...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013110514
We find that the presence of independent directors who are blockholders (IDBs) in firms promotes better CEO contracting and monitoring, and higher firm valuation. Using a panel of about 11,500 firm-years with a unique, hand-collected dataset on IDB-identity and a novel instrument, we find that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012906210
We document that firms can effectively retain executives by granting deferred equity pay. We show this by analyzing a unique regulatory change (FAS 123-R) that prompted 723 firms to suddenly eliminate stock option vesting periods. This allowed CEOs to keep 33% more options when departing the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012937264
In this study, we examine whether CEOs' stock-based compensation has any relationship with the disclosure of highly proprietary information. While prior studies suggest that stock-based compensation provides managers with an incentive to enhance their voluntary disclosures in general, we argue...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012853081