determinant of the feasibility of such signaling. A firm may use price alone as a signal, or price and quality together. Both …If a product has two dimensions of quality, one observable and one not, a firm can use observable quality as a signal … of unobservable quality. The correlation between consumers' valuation of high quality in each dimension is a key …

determinant of the feasibility of such signaling. A firm may use price alone as a signal, or price and quality together. Both …If a product has two dimensions of quality, one observable and one not, a firm can use observable quality as a signal … of unobservable quality. The correlation between consumers' valuation of high quality in each dimension is a key …

Firms signal high quality through high prices even if the market structure is highly competitive and price competition … is severe. In a symmetric Bertrand oligopoly where products may differ only in their quality, production cost is … increasing in quality and the quality of each firm’s product is private information (not known to consumers or to other firms …

Firms signal high quality through high prices even if the market structure is highly competitive and price competition … is severe. In a symmetric Bertrand oligopoly where products may differ only in their quality, production cost is … increasing in quality and the quality of each firm’s product is private information (not known to consumers or to other firms …

Firms signal high quality through high prices even if the market structure is highly competitive and price competition … is severe. In a symmetric Bertrand oligopoly where products may differ only in their quality, production cost is … increasing in quality and the quality of each firm’s product is private information (not known to consumers or to other firms …

Firms signal high quality through high prices even if the market structure is highly competitive and price competition … is severe. In a symmetric Bertrand oligopoly where products may differ only in their quality, production cost is … increasing in quality and the quality of each firm’s product is private information (not known to consumers or to other firms …

conveys full information about the quality of the good to uninformed buyers. Deceiving the uninformed buyers by charging a … high price and mimicking a high quality is not profitable when the competitive fringe is large enough. Since a higher price …

How does the need to signal quality through price affect equilibrium pricing and profits, when a firm faces a similarly …-situated rival? In this paper, we provide a model of non-cooperative signaling by two firms that compete over a continuum of … private information about its own product's quality. We characterize a symmetric separating equilibrium in which each firm …

Two firms produce a good with a horizontal and a vertical characteristic called quality. The difference in the … unobservable quality levels determines how the firms share the market. We consider two scenarios: In the first one, firms disclose … quality; in the second one, they send costly signals thereof. Under non-comparative advertising a firm advertises its own …

We embed signaling in the classical Cournot model in which several firms sell a homogeneous good. The quality is known … quantity decision. We characterize the unique signaling Cournot equilibrium in which the price signals quality to the … to all the firms, but only to some buyers. The quantity-setting firms can manipulate the price to signal quality. Because …