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Coordination failure in repeated games with almost-public monitoring

Mailath, George J.; Morris, Stephen - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; journal of the Econometric … 1 (2006), pp. 311-340

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003820143

Repeated games with almost-public monitoring

Mailath, George J.; Morris, Stephen - 1999

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001426812

Repeated games with almost-public monitoring

Mailath, George J.; Morris, Stephen - In: Journal of economic theory 102 (2002) 1, pp. 189-228

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001661309

Repeated games with almost-public monitoring

Mailath, George J.; Morris, Stephen - 1999

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001411783

Coordination failure in repeated games with almost-public monitoring

Mailath, George J.; Morris, Stephen - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 1 (2006) 3, pp. 311-340

Some private-monitoring games, that is, games with no public histories, can have histories that are almost public. These games are the natural result of perturbing public monitoring games towards private monitoring. We explore the extent to which it is possible to coordinate continuation play in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011702996

Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring

Mailath, George J.; Morris, Stephen - 2005

Some private-monitoring games, that is, games with no public histories, can have histories that are almost public. These games are the natural result of perturbing public-monitoring games towards private monitoring. We explore the extent to which it is possible to coordinate continuation play in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014070123