Repeated games with almost-public monitoring
Year of publication: |
2002
|
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Authors: | Mailath, George J. ; Morris, Stephen |
Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 102.2002, 1, p. 189-228
|
Subject: | Leistungsbeurteilung | Employee performance appraisal | Signalling | Theorie | Theory | Wiederholte Spiele | Repeated games |
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