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heterogeneity in the dispersion of private value components. I use the asymmetric ascending auction model of Hong and Shum (2003) to …
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auction model in which a seller's choice of reserve price signals her private information about the object's quality. We show …. We estimate the reserve price signaling model using a novel dataset from a large online auto auction platform. We find …
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If bidders are uncertain whether the auctioneer sticks to the announced reserve, some bidders respond by not bidding, speculating that the auctioneer may revoke the reserve. However, the reserve inadvertently signals the auctioneer's type, which drives a unique separating and a multitude of...
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learns his own valuation. Using a simple discrete asymmetric first-price auction setting, we show that a bidder may indeed …-price auction model. Finally, we use a specific signaling structure with uniform distributions to show that signaling need not be … beneficial for any precision of the signal. -- Asymmetric auction ; first-price auction ; signaling …
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