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Huck, Steffen; Konrad, Kai A.; Mueller, Wieland - 2005

The seminal paper by Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983) showed that merger in a standard Cournot framework with linear demand and linear costs is not profitable unless a large majority of the firms are involved in the merger. However, many strategic aspects matter for firm competition such as...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261187

Competition as a socially desirable dilemma theory vs. experimental evidence

Engel, Christoph - 2009

Cartels are inherently instable. Each cartelist is best off if it breaks the cartel, while the remaining firms remain …, theory even predicts that strategic interaction forces firms to set the market clearing price. For society, this would be … oligopoly as a linear public good. -- Cartel ; Oligopoly ; Bertrand ; Cournot ; Public Good ; Externality ; Experiment …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003877116

Strategic Delegation Improves Cartel Stability

Han, Martijn A. - 2011

profits. However, with infinitely repeated interaction, strategic delegation allows for an improvement in cartel stability …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013132037

On the Stability of Multimarket Collusion in Price-Setting Supergames

Bond, Eric W. - 2012

In this paper we examine how trade liberalization affects collusive stability in the context of multimarket interactions. The model we consider is a segmented-markets duopoly in which price-setting firms pool their incentive constraints across markets to sustain their most collusive outcome. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013113914

Cartel Stability under Product Differentiation

Marini, Marco A. - 2020

This note considers cartel stability when the cartelized products are vertically differentiated. If market shares are …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012837017

Strategic leaks in first-price auctions and tacit collusion : the case of spying and counter-spying

Fan, Cuihong; Chŏn, Pyŏng-hŏn; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2021

We analyze strategic leaks due to spying out a rival’s bid in a first-price auction. Such leaks induce sequential bidding, complicated by the fact that the spy may be a counterspy who serves the interests of the spied at bidder and reports strategically distorted information. This ambiguity...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012507333

Collusive agreements in vertically differentiated markets

Marini, Marco A. - 2017

proliferating their products. It is shown that a selective pruning within the cartel always occurs. Moreover, by associating a … cooperative (or coalitional) stability of the whole industry cartel is the equidistance of firms’ products along the quality …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011660599

Communication, Renegotiation, and the Scope for Collusion

Cooper, David J.; Kuhn, Kai-Uwe - 2009

to successfully establish collusion, consistent with the existing theory of collusion. However, collusion is even more …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014201287

Algorithmic price recommendations and collusion : experimental evidence

Hunold, Matthias; Werner, Tobias - 2023

This paper investigates the collusive and competitive effects of algorithmic price recommendations on market outcomes. These recommendations are often non-binding and common in many markets, especially on online platforms. We develop a theoretical framework and derive two algorithms that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014442786

Vertical mergers, foreclosure and raising rivals' costs : experimental evidence

Normann, Hans-Theo - 2010

The hypothesis that vertically integrated firms have an incentive to foreclose the input market because foreclosure raises its downstream rivals' costs is the subject of much controversy in the theoretical industrial organization literature. A powerful argument against this hypothesis is that,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008666950

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