Showing 1 - 10 of 651
This paper revisits the tragedy of the commons when agents have different capabilities in both production and encroachment activities, and can allocate their time between them. Under fairly general assumptions on production and encroachment technologies, an individual's expected income is convex...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011608842
This paper revisits the tragedy of the commons when agents have different capabilities in both production and encroachment activities, and can allocate their time between them. Under fairly general assumptions on production and encroachment technologies, an individual's expected income is convex...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014123382
This paper builds on an analytical tool for studying entrepreneurship in a new classical general equilibrium framework. The entrepreneurial economy model takes the consumer-producer economy model and makes explicit the role of the entrepreneur. This paper uses it to study entrepreneurial...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014184832
Social engineering refers to deliberate attempts, often under the form of legislative moves, to promote changes in customs and norms that hurt the interests of marginalized population groups. This paper explores the analytical conditions under which social engineering is more or less likely to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011943748
Social engineering refers to deliberate attempts, often under the form of legislative moves, to promote changes in customs and norms that hurt the interests of marginalized population groups. This paper explores the analytical conditions under which social engineering is more or less likely to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011663702
Robert Aumann's agreement theorem and subsequent work shows that people who are rational in a certain Bayesian sense cannot agree to disagree on matters of fact, as long as there is common knowledge of this common rationality. This result hinges on a type of epistemic impartiality: a rational...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012863940
How can a single player defend against the threat of a coordinated attack by a group? For example, how can a central bank defend a currency peg against speculators, a government against a revolution or a prison warden against a breakout? Bentham (1787) proposed an innovative prison concept based...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013014971
How can a single player defend against the threat of a coordinated attack by a group? For example, how can a central bank defend a currency peg against speculators, a government against a revolution or a prison warden against a breakout? Bentham (1787) proposed an innovative prison concept based...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013015698
Many experiments indicate that most individuals are not purely motivated by material self interest, but also care about the well being of others. In this paper we examine tournaments among inequity averse agents, who dislike disadvantageous inequity (envy) and advantageous inequity (compassion)....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262248
Many experiments indicate that most individuals are not purely motivated by material self interest, but also care about the well being of others. In this paper we examine tournaments among inequity averse agents, who dislike disadvantageous inequity (envy) and advantageous inequity (compassion)....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263076