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Rent seeking contest shapes the risk preference of the contestants. It instills in the weaker contestant who has little to lose and much to gain a preference for risk taking, and the weaker the contestant, the stronger the instilled preference for risk taking. On the other hand, it causes the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013083721
This article examines behavior in the two-player, constant-sum Colonel Blotto game with asymmetric resources in which players maximize the expected number of battlefields won. The experimental results support all major theoretical predictions. In the auction treatment, where winning a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013316350
This chapter surveys the past applications of game theory to the study of terrorism. By capturing the strategic … interplay between terrorists and targeted governments, game theory is an appropriate methodology for investigating terrorism and … indicates novel directions for applying game theory to terrorism-related issues (e.g., cooperative collectives to strengthen …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014024404
Famous cultural monuments are often regarded as unique icons, making them an attractive target for terrorists. Despite huge military and police outlays, terrorist attacks on important monuments can hardly be avoided. We argue that an effective strategy for discouraging terrorist attacks on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014060595
Present anti-terrorist policy concentrates almost exclusively on deterrence. It seeks to fend off terrorism by raising … and induces in some cases even more terrorism. This is, in particular, the case if deterrence policy induces a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014097870
This paper looks at the case where there are two branches of a terrorist group, which operate in two different locations targeting two different countries and regions. This does away with the free rider’s problem arising out of pre-emption that has been highlighted in the literature. The free...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014264292
We model an infinitely repeated Tullock contest, over the sharing of some given resource, between two ethnic groups. The resource is allocated by a composite state institution according to relative ethnic control; hence the ethnic groups contest the extent of institutional ethnic bias. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011289899
We introduce three variations of the Hirshleifer-Skaperdas conflict game to study experimentally the effects of post-conflict behavior and repeated interaction on the allocation of effort between production and appropriation. Without repeated interaction, destruction of resources by defeated...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009771751
The paper presents experimental evidence on the impact of managers and their incentives on the behavior of group members in intergroup contests. I find that members follow the nonbinding investment recommendations of their group manager in particular if the managers payoff does not depend on the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010340540
We examine how cross-community cost or benefit spillovers, arising from the consumption of group-specific public goods, affect both inter-group conflicts over the appropriation of such goods and decentralized private provision for their production. Our model integrates production versus...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012614103