This paper addresses the question of delegation in an organisation where there is an initial asymmetry of information … elicit agent's superior information and in contrast, we posit that the decision and the state of the world parameter cannot …'s information. We can show that delegated decisions completely reveal the state of the world to the principal. Therefore the …

agent, the decision of the agent signals his private information to the principal. The revelation of information, associated … to elicit the agent's private information. We establish this result by using the properties of signalling game. Finally …, we show that, even if there are loss of control associated with delegation, the benefits of information revelation …

. We assume that the seller from the outset has private information about the fraction of the surplus that he can realize … on his own, and show that this leads to higher investment compared to the complete information case. This positive effect …

general, the more the receiver is informed, the less information she can extract from the sender. In fact, when the receiver … is as informed as the sender, no information can be conveyed via cheap talk for an arbitrarily small preference bias …

This paper analyzes delegation and joint decision making in an environment with private information and partially …

signal high costs. Dishonest low cost and honest high cost agents pool on the complete information outcome with high costs …