Bilateral bargaining situations are often characterized by informational asymmetries concerning the size of what is at … of asymmetric information on proposer behavior in two different situations which allow for a variation of responder veto … compared to the dictator game is (marginally) smaller when the proposer is in the superior information position. Further we …

members of an information sharingCooperative. Once collected, information about the location of productive sh-ing sites is an … excludable public good. We show that independent shermen donot internalize the full value of information and do not replicate rst …-best searchpatterns. An information sharing Cooperative faces a free-riding problem as eachmember prefers that another undertake costly …

,questions whether norm deviations can be detected and thus punished. By investing in information acquisition, aresponder in an ultimatum … can be rather high (‘high payoff mode’) orlow (‘low payoff mode’). The responder can buy information about the proposer … buy reward information (30 out of 55). Buyingreward information on average did not help the responder nor did it improve …

This paper argues that the notion of focal points is important in understanding bargaining processes. Recent literature … confines a discussion of the usefulness of the notion to coordination problems and when bargaining experiments result in … equal split division and it re-interprets recent experimental evidence in bargaining games. Experimental economists should …