We provide the first experimental results on a two-stage model of militarized conflict based on the ubiquitous ultimatum bargaining game that dominates much of the theoretical analysis of international relations. We illustrate how data from experimental trials deviate from the equilibrium...

Data from three bargaining games - the Dictator Game, the Ultimatum Game, and the Third-Party Punishment Game - played in 15 societies are presented. The societies range from US undergraduates to Amazonian, Arctic, and African hunter-gatherers. Behaviour within the games varies markedly across...

Intro -- Contents -- Illustrations -- Contributors -- Part I - Theory, Method, and Comparative Analysis -- Chapter 1. Introduction, Project History, and Guide to the Volume - Jean Ensminger and Joseph Henrich -- Chapter 2. Theoretical Foundations: The Coevolution of Social Norms, Intrinsic...