This paper examines how cooperation in an insurance game depends on risk preferences and the riskiness of income. It considers a dynamic game where commitment is limited, and characterizes the level of cooperation as measured by the reciprocal of the discount factor above which perfect risk...

The commitment ability of governments is neither infinite nor zero but intermediate. In this paper, we determine the commitment ability that a government needs to implement a unique equilibrium outcome and rule out self-fulfilling expectations. We show that, in a large class of static...

This paper studies the revelation principle for mechanisms with limited commitment when agents have correlated persistent types over the infinite horizon. After characterizing necessary and sufficient conditions to construct a mechanism with same ex-ante payoffs and interim beliefs to all...

This paper studies a selling mechanism where the seller first charges a fee for advice (information structure) then sells a product. When the buyer has no private information, the seller can extract full surplus, both when the seller has private information and when he doesn't. If only the buyer...

This paper studies mechanism design with limited commitment where agents have persistent correlated types over the infinite horizon. The mechanism designer now faces the informed-principal problem in addition to usual issues with i.i.d. types. With an infinite horizon and nondurable good, there...