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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009011654
, Patrizia Pérez-Asurmendi, and Abdelmonaim Tlidi -- 5 Analyzing the Practical Relevance of Voting Paradoxes via Ehrhart Theory … the No-Show Paradox for Condorcet Extensions Using Ehrhart Theory and Computer Simulations Felix Brandt, Johannes Hofbauer …. Eric Kamwa and Issofa Moyouwou -- Part V Game Theory 13 Dummy Players and the Quota in Weighted Voting Games: Some Further …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012392142
decision mechanisms. Featuring papers from all fields of social choice and game theory, it presents probability arguments to …, Patrizia Pérez-Asurmendi, and Abdelmonaim Tlidi -- 5 Analyzing the Practical Relevance of Voting Paradoxes via Ehrhart Theory … the No-Show Paradox for Condorcet Extensions Using Ehrhart Theory and Computer Simulations Felix Brandt, Johannes Hofbauer …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012302559
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008666598
Representations of constitutions -- to Part I -- Constitutions, effectivity functions, and game forms -- Nash consistent representations -- Acceptable representations -- Strongly consistent representations -- Nash consistent representation through lottery models -- On the continuity of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013522843
does AV (this is demonstrated empirically in the case of a recent election of the Game Theory Society). A decision …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013140591
We analyze and evaluate the different decision rules describing the Council of Ministers of the EU starting from 1958 up to date. Most of the existing studies use the Banzhaf index (for binary voting) or the Shapley-Shubik index (for distributive politics). We argue in favor of the nucleolus as...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014184868
Beyond determining whether procedures can be manipulated, the real goal for any analysis of "strategic behavior" is to identify all settings where and when this can be done, who can do it, and what they should do. By applying the geometric approach of Saari [7, 8] to the Kemeny's Rule (KR), we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014149363
In this paper we show in the context of voting games with plurality rule that the "perfect" equilibrium concept does not appear restrictive enough, since, independently of preferences, it can exclude at most the election of only one candidate. Furthermore, some examples show that there are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014149367
The storable votes mechanism is a method of voting for committees that meet periodically to consider a series of binary decisions. Each member is allocated a fixed budget of votes to be cast as desired over the multiple decisions. Voters are induced to spend more votes on those decisions that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014075154