We present a dynamic model of legislative bargaining in which policy making proceeds until the proposer has no more incentive to make a new proposal to replace the previously approved policy. We characterize stationary Markov perfect equilibria for the game and show that in all pure-strategy...

Diermeier and Fong (2008a) recently proposed a legislative bargaining model with reconsideration in the context of a distributive policy environment. In this paper we prove general existence and necessary conditions for pure-strategy stationary equilibria for any finite policy space and...

In this paper we explore the usefulness of a particular model of bounded rationality in the context of voting to show a crucial relationship between uncertainty about players' actions (in the information that voters receive or in how they make their decisions) and levels of turnout. The model...

This paper presents a model of consumer boycotts where the discrete choices of concerned consumers are represented as a stochastic processes. We solve for the limiting distribution of the process and analyze its properties. We then discuss how the model relates to game-theoretic models of...