We study the slot allocation problem where agents have quasi-linear single-peaked preferences over slots and identify the rules satisfying efficiency, strategy-proofness, and individual rationality. Since the quasi-linear single-peaked domain is not connected, the famous characterization of the...

We show that there is no consistent Pareto improvement over any stable mechanism. To overcome this impossibility, we introduce the following weak consistency requirement: Whenever a set of students, each of whom is assigned to a school that is under-demanded at the student-optimal stable...

We consider the problem of allocating multiple units of an indivisible object among agents and collecting payments. Each agent can receive multiple units of the object, and his (consumption) bundle is a pair of the units he receives and his payment. An agent's preference over bundles may be...

We study manipulability of stable matching mechanisms and show that manipulability comparisons are equivalent to preference comparisons: for any agent, a mechanism is more manipulable than another if and only if this agent prefers the latter to the former. In particular, this implies that no two...

We investigate the similarities and differences between matching markets and other canonical economic settings in the presence of complementarity. In particular, we explain the formal connections between the structure of matching markets with complementary contracts and games with strategic...

Online platforms that match customers with service providers utilize a wide variety of designs: some implement a searchable directory of one side of the market (i.e., Airbnb, Google Local Services); some allow both sides of the market to search and initiate contact (i.e., Upwork, Care.com);...

We propose a solution to the trade-off between Pareto efficiency and stability in matching markets. We define a matching to be essentially stable if any claim initiates a chain of reassignments that ultimately results in the initial claimant losing the object she claimed to a third agent. Our...

The National Resident Matching program strives for a stable matching of medical students to teaching hospitals. With the presence of couples, stable matchings need not exist. For any student preferences, we show that each instance of a stable matching problem has a 'nearby' instance with a table...

We study ex-ante priority respecting (ex-ante stable) lotteries in the context of object allocation under thick priorities. We show that ex-ante stability as a fairness condition is very demanding: Only few agent-object pairs have a positive probability of being matched in an ex-ante stable...

This paper identifies a condition for an efficient social choice rule to be fully implementable when we take into account investment efficiency. To do so, we extend the standard implementation problem to include endogenous ex ante and ex post investments. In our problem, the social planner aims...