We adopt the largest consistent set defined by Chwe [J. of Econ. Theory 63 (1994), 299-235] to predict which coalition structures are possibly stable when players are farsighted. We also introduce a refinement, the largest cautious consistent set, based on the assumption that players are...

The paper examines the formation of free trade agreements (FTAs) as a network formation game. We consider a general n-country model in which countries trade differentiated industrial commodities as well as a numeraire good. Countries may be different in the size of the industrial good industry...

This paper studies the incentive compatibility of solutions to generalized indivisible good allocation problems introduced by Sönmez (1999), which contain the well-known marriage problems (Gale and Shapley, 1962) and the housing markets (Shapley and Scarf, 1974) as special cases. In particular,...

This paper provides a co-operative as well as a non-cooperative analysis of weighted majority games. The co-operative solution concept introduced here, the Stable Demand Set, yields a meaningful selection within the Mas-Colell Bargaining Set, it contains the Core, it eliminates the "dominated"...

Consider an environment with widespread externalities, and suppose that binding agreements can be written. We study coalition formation in such a setting. Our analysis proceeds by defining on a partition function an extensive form bargaining game. We establish the existence of a stationary...

We adopt the notion of von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets to predict which matchings are possibly stable when agents are farsighted in one-to-one matching problems. We provide the characterization of von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets: a set of matchings is a von...

The ex ante incentive compatible core of an exchange economy with private information is the (standard) core of a socially designed characteristic function, which expresses the fact that coalitions allocate goods by means of random incentive compatible mechanisms. We first survey some results in...

We propose positive and normative foundations for the average prekernel of NTU games, and compare them with the existing ones for the prekernel. In our non-cooperative analysis, the average prekernel is understood as the equilibrium payoffs of a game where each player faces the possibility of...

This paper extends the Baron-Ferejohn model of legislative bargaining to general weighted majority games with two modifications: first, payoff division can only be agreed upon after the coalition has formed (two-stage bargaining); second, negotiations in the coalition can break down, in which...