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Anderton, Charles H.; Carter, John R. - In: Handbook of defense economics : volume 2, Defense in a …, (pp. 1211-1258). 2007

Peace economics can be defined as the use of economics to understand the causes and effects of violent conflict in the … peace economics, highlighting seminal as well as current contributions. Particularly noteworthy among the newer developments … relatively large cross-country panels. The topics surveyed include: the relation of peace economics to both defense economics and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014024394

War and relatedness

Spolaore, Enrico; Wacziarg, Romain - 2009

We develop a theory of interstate conflict in which the degree of genealogical relatedness between populations has a positive effect on their conflict propensities because more closely related populations, on average, tend to interact more and develop more disputes over sets of common issues. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010266016

War and relatedness

Spolaore, Enrico; Wacziarg, Romain - 2009

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003854499

Wars of conquest and independence

Hodler, Roland; Yektaş, Hadi - 2013

Wars of conquest and wars of independence are characterized by an asymmetric payoff structure: one party gets aggregate production if it wins, and its own production if it loses, while the other party gets only its own production if it wins, and nothing if it loses. We study a model of war with...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009754525

Splitting games : Nash equilibrium and the optimisation problem

Martins, Ana Paula - 2010

This research states the stylised n (more than two) players' splitting problem as a mathematical programme, relying on definitions of the values of the game and problem stationarity to generate tractable reduced forms, and derives the known solutions according to the properties of pertaining...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011524731

Reconciling the Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky cooperative solutions : generalized maximands of CES form

Martins, Ana Paula - 2002

This note suggests variations to the baseline Nash cooperative solution that take into account the Kalai-Smorodinsky critique. One the one hand, a CES form of the maximand is proven to accommodate both the generalized two-person Nash and the Kalai-Smorodinsky - as other proportional - solutions...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011512976

Better feared than loved : reputations and the motives for conflict

Long, Iain W. - 2014

Throughout history, victory in conflict has created fearsome reputations. With it, the victor ensures greater allegiance of the wider population, increasing their rents at the expense of their enemy. Such reputational concerns generate two motives for conflict. When only victory or defeat is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010412341

Rent Seeking Contest and Indirect Risk Preference

Teng, Jimmy - 2013

Rent seeking contest shapes the risk preference of the contestants. It instills in the weaker contestant who has little to lose and much to gain a preference for risk taking, and the weaker the contestant, the stronger the instilled preference for risk taking. On the other hand, it causes the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013083721

A Tug-of-War Team Contest

Häfner, Samuel - 2016

This paper analyzes a tug-of-war contest between two teams. In each round of the tug of war a pair of agents from the opposing teams competes in a private value all-pay auction with asymmetric type distributions and effort effectiveness. Whichever team arrives first at a given lead in terms of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013003550

War and Relatedness

Spolaore, Enrico; Wacziarg, Romain T. - 2021

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013316348

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