We use quantifiers and selection functions to represent simultaneous move games. Quantifiers and selection functions are examples of higher-order functions. A higher order function is a function whose domain is itself a set of functions. Thus, quantifiers and selection func- tions allow players...

In response to Wooders (2001), I review the contributions of Engl and Scotchmer (1996) regarding monotonicity and the hedonic core, show how our contributions diverge from those previously in the literature, and highlight the importance of our assumptions by giving counterexamples, particularly...

We will call a game a reachable (pure strategy) equilibria game if starting from any strategy by any player, by a sequence of best-response moves we are able to reach a (pure strategy) equilibrium. We give a characterization of all finite strategy space duopolies with reachable equilibria. We...

In response to Wooders (2001), I review the contributions of Engl and Scotchmer (1996) regarding monotonicity and the hedonic core, show how our contributions diverge from those previously in the literature, and highlight the importance of our assumptions by giving counterexamples, particularly...

We provide an evolutionary foundation to evidence that in some situations humans maintain either optimistic or pessimistic attitudes towards uncertainty and are ignorant to relevant aspects of the environment. Players in strategic games face Knightian uncertainty about opponents' actions and...

Mixed Nash equilibria are a cornerstone of game theory, but their empirical relevance has always been controversial. We study in the laboratory two games whose unique NE is in completely mixed strategies; other treatments include the matching protocol (pairwise random vs population...