This is a comment on Urs Schweizer's paper with the above title presented at the International Seminar on the New Institutional Economics in Wallerfangen, May/June 1989. After focusing on problems in selecting rules and outcomes of rules, it discusses the Buchanan-Tullock issue of...

This paper analyzes the formation of self-enforcing climate agreements, or stable climate coalitions, when all countries have the option to fight climate change by purchasing (the right to extract) fossil-energy deposits. First, we consider the stand-alone deposit purchase policy and then...

In their "Calculus of Consent" Buchanan and Tullock argued that self-interested agents choose social rules at the constitutional level with unanimity provided that these agents are sufficiently uncertain about their precise role at the post-constitutional level at which these rules will be...

In this paper a game model is considered whose strategically interacting agents are a polluting firm that can save abatement costs by illegal waste emissions and a monitoring agent (controller) whose job it is to prevent such pollution. When deciding on whether to dispose of its waste legally or...

Itaya et al. (2014) study the conditions for sustainability and stability of capital tax coordination in a repeated game model with tax-revenue maximizing governments. One of their major results is that the grand tax coalition is never stable and sustainable. The purpose of this note is to prove...

This paper studies within a multi-country model with international trade the stability of international environmental agreements (IEAs) when countries regulate carbon emissions either by taxes or caps. Regardless of whether coalitions play Nash or are Stackelberg leaders the principal message is...