A note on stable and sustainable global tax coordination with Leviathan governments
Year of publication: |
March 2015
|
---|---|
Authors: | Eichner, Thomas ; Pethig, RĂ¼diger |
Other Persons: | Itaya, Jun-ichi (contributor) ; Okamura, Makoto (contributor) ; Yamaguchi, Chikara (contributor) |
Published in: |
European journal of political economy. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0176-2680, ZDB-ID 623005-2. - Vol. 37.2015, p. 64-67
|
Subject: | Global tax coordination | Repeated game | Sustainability | Stability | Steuerwettbewerb | Tax competition | Internationale Wirtschaftspolitik | International economic policy | Steuerharmonisierung | Tax harmonization | Wiederholte Spiele | Repeated games | Globalisierung | Globalization | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Welt | World | Nachhaltige Entwicklung | Sustainable development |
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