’ bid. Equilibrium behavior in the first-price auction is mostly unaffected but there are multiple equilibria in the second …- price auction. Consequently, comparative statics across price rules are equivocal. Experimentally, leaks in the first- price … auction favor second movers but harm first movers and sellers, as theoretically predicted. Low to medium leak probabilities …

-cost firm under incomplete information: a separating auction implies adverse selection and relies substantially on commitment to … allocation and transfer rules. A pooling auction serves as a commitment device against ex-post opportunistic behavior and … alleviates adverse selection. It can earn the investor a higher expected payoff than a separating auction, even when consistency …

We auction scarce rights to play the Proposer and Responder positions in ultimatum games. As a control treatment, we … randomly allocate these rights and charge exogenous participation fees. These participation fee sequences match the auction … to a session-specific Nash equilibrium, and auction prices emerge supporting this equilibrium by the principle of forward …