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Fair salaries and the moral costs of corruption
Abbink, Klaus - 2000
In a bribery experiment, we test the hypothesis that distributive fairness considerations make relatively well-paid public officials less corruptible. Corrupt decisions impose damages to workers whose wage is varied in two treatments. However, there is no apparent difference in behaviour.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011538846
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The role of framing, inequity and history in a corruption game : some experimental evidence
Chaudhuri, Ananish; Paichayontvijit, Tirnud; Sbai, Erwann - In: Games 7 (2016) 2, pp. 1-24
history of past play has little effect on the level of corruption. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011515620
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Whistle-blower protection : theory and experimental evidence
Mechtenberg, Lydia; Mühlheußer, Gerd; Roider, Andreas - 2017
Whistle-blowing by employees plays a major role in uncovering corporate fraud. Various recent laws aim at improving protection of whistle-blowers and enhancing their willingness to report. Evidence on the effectiveness of such legislation is, however, scarce. Moreover, critics have raised...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011625350
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Whistle-blower protection : theory and experimental evidence
Mechtenberg, Lydia; Mühlheußer, Gerd; Roider, Andreas - 2017
Whistle-blowing by employees plays a major role in uncovering corporate fraud. Various recent laws aim at improving protection of whistle-blowers and enhancing their willingness to report. Evidence on the effectiveness of such legislation is, however, scarce. Moreover, critics have raised...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011619649
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Risk attitude, beliefs, and information in a corruption game: An experimental analysis
Berninghaus, Siegfried K.; Haller, Sven; Krüger, Tyll; … - 2012
For our experiment on corruption, we designed a coordination game to model the influence of risk attitudes, beliefs … reduces corruption. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010291803
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Risk attitude, beliefs, and information in a corruption game: An experimental analysis
Berninghaus, Siegfried K.; Haller, Sven; Krüger, Tyll; … - 2010
For our experiment on corruption we designed a coordination game to model the influence of risk attitudes, beliefs, and … behavior. The experimental results show that a higher degree of uncertainty in the informational setting reduces corruption. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010301733
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Risk attitude, beliefs, and information in a corruption game : an experimental analysis
Berninghaus, Siegfried; Haller, Sven; Krüger, Tyll; … - 2010
For our experiment on corruption we designed a coordination game to model the influence of risk attitudes, beliefs, and … behavior. The experimental results show that a higher degree of uncertainty in the informational setting reduces corruption …. -- Corruption ; game theory ; experiment ; risk attitude ; beliefs …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008654377
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Let them take gifts, and cheat those who seek influence
Lambsdorff, Johann; Nell, Mathias - 2005
to disband the "pact of silence" characteristic of corrupt arrangements. -- Corruption ; Asymmetric Sanctions …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009424464
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Risk attitude, beliefs, and information in a corruption game : an experimental analysis
Berninghaus, Siegfried; Haller, Sven; Krüger, Tyll; … - 2012
For our experiment on corruption, we designed a coordination game to model the influence of risk attitudes, beliefs … reduces corruption. -- Corruption ; game theory ; experiment ; risk attitude ; beliefs …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009567098
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Risk Attitude, Beliefs, and Information in a Corruption Game - An Experimental Analysis
Berninghaus, Siegfried - 2013
For our experiment on corruption, we designed a coordination game to model the influence of risk attitudes, beliefs … setting reduces corruption …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013089808