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can be tricky, this paper uses the crime strategic model (inspection game) proposed by Tsebelis. This model shows that any … attempts to increase the severity of punishment will alter the payoff of the individuals involved, leaving unchanged the … frequency of violation at equilibrium. This result is misleading: payoffs are not independent and the crime game can not be …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011544186
of punishment. This paper presents the first controlled experiment to study a third important factor that has been mainly … will be punished is dissolved and the timing at which the punishment is actually imposed, as well as the combination …: either no delay (immediate resolution and immediate punishment) or maximum delay (both resolution and punishment as much as …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012171815
of punishment. This paper presents the first controlled experiment to study a third important factor that has been mainly … will be punished is dissolved and the timing at which the punishment is actually imposed, as well as the combination …: either no delay (immediate resolution and immediate punishment) or maximum delay (both resolution and punishment as much as …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012438420
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Ostracism, or exclusion by peers, has been practiced since ancient times as a severe form of punishment against … form of punishment and decreases theft by excluded members once they are re-admitted into the group. However, it also leads …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012591202
) there is preference uncertainty. In a linear public good with punishment meted out by a disinterested participant, I test … two implications of the model: (a) participants increase contributions in reaction to imperfect punishment; (b) imperfect … punishment helps sustain cooperation if participants experience free-riding …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013081462
) there is preference uncertainty. In a linear public good with punishment meted out by a disinterested participant, I test … two implications of the model: (a) participants increase contributions in reaction to imperfect punishment; (b) imperfect … punishment helps sustain cooperation if participants experience free-riding. -- deterrence ; public good experiment ; inequity …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009742336