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We consider games where an analyst is not confident about players' true information structure for payoff-relevant parameters. We define a robust prediction by a set of action profiles such that, given any information structure among the players, there is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium given that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013293638
A self-proclaimed expert uses past observations of a stochastic process to make probabilistic predictions about the process. An inspector applies a test function to the infinite sequence of predictions provided by the expert and the observed realization of the process in order to check the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011700245
Reputational herding has been considered as a driving force behind economic and financial forecasts clustered around consensus values. Strategic coordination can consequently explain poor performances of prediction markets as resulting from the distinct incentives that forecasters face. While...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013056991
. Empirical research shows evidence that the level of forecast quality is generally rather poor. In order to gain further insight … the concept of forecast rationality evolved. This means that systematic errors like frequent overestimations have to be … avoided. The first part of the dissertation thesis cares about the common understanding of forecast rationality. It is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011305813
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002303499
We define a notion of correlated equilibrium for games with incomplete information in a general setting with finite players, finite actions, and finite states, which we call Bayes correlated equilibrium. The set of Bayes correlated equilibria of a fixed incomplete information game equals the set...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014176751
We examine subjects’ behavior in sender-receiver games where there are gains from trade and alignment of interests in one of the two states. We elicit subjects’ beliefs, risk and other-regarding preferences. Our design also allows us to examine the behavior of subjects in both roles, to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014186417
We compare communication about private information to communication about actions in a one-shot 2-person public good game with private information.The informed player, who knows the exact return from contributing and whose contribution is unobserved, can send a message about the return or her...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014196597
We model a game similar to the interaction between an academic advisor and advisee. Like the classic cheap talk setup, an informed player sends information to an uninformed receiver who is to take an action which affects the payoffs of both sender and receiver. However, unlike the classic cheap...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014204413
We study coordination failures in many simultaneously occurring coordination problems called projects. Players encounter one of these projects, but have an outside option to search for another of the projects. Drawing on the global games approach, we show that such a mobile game has a unique...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014217207