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Robust Prediction in Games with Uncertain Parameters

Miura, Shintaro; Yamashita, Takuro - 2022

We consider games where an analyst is not confident about players' true information structure for payoff-relevant parameters. We define a robust prediction by a set of action profiles such that, given any information structure among the players, there is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium given that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013293638

Many inspections are manipulable

Shmaya, Eran - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 3 (2008) 3, pp. 367-382

A self-proclaimed expert uses past observations of a stochastic process to make probabilistic predictions about the process. An inspector applies a test function to the infinite sequence of predictions provided by the expert and the observed realization of the process in order to check the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011700245

Strategic Coordination in Forecasting. An Experimental Study

Bizer, Kilian - 2014

Reputational herding has been considered as a driving force behind economic and financial forecasts clustered around consensus values. Strategic coordination can consequently explain poor performances of prediction markets as resulting from the distinct incentives that forecasters face. While...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013056991

Rationalität und Qualität von Wirtschaftsprognosen

Scheier, Johannes - 2014

. Empirical research shows evidence that the level of forecast quality is generally rather poor. In order to gain further insight … the concept of forecast rationality evolved. This means that systematic errors like frequent overestimations have to be … avoided. The first part of the dissertation thesis cares about the common understanding of forecast rationality. It is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011305813

Gaming : prospective for forecasting

Brewer, Garry D. - 1974

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002303499

Disclosure under unawareness : an experiment

Li, Ying Xue; Schipper, Burkhard - 2025

We consider a disclosure game between a seller and a buyer. The seller knows the quality of a good, while the buyer does not. Before the buyer decides how many units to purchase, the seller can disclose verifiable information about the good. The better the information, the more the buyer is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015405163

Games with information constraints : seeds and spillovers

Galperti, Simone; Perego, Jacopo - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 20 (2025) 2, pp. 667-711

We study equilibrium behavior in incomplete‐information games under two information constraints: seeds and spillovers. The former restricts which agents can initially receive information. The latter specifies how this information spills over to other agents. Our main result characterizes the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015415279

A Principal-Agent Model of Sequential Testing

Gerardi, Dino - 2008

This paper analyzes the optimal provision of incentives in a sequential testing context. In every period the agent can acquire costly information that is relevant to the principal's decision. Neither the agent's effort nor the realizations of his signals are observable. First, we assume that the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012769351

Bilateral trade with a benevolent intermediary

Eilat, Ran; Pauzner, Ady - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 4, pp. 1655-1714

We study intermediaries who seek to maximize gains from trade in bilateral negotiations. Intermediaries are players: they cannot commit to act against their objective function and deny, in some cases, trade they believe to be beneficial. This impairs their ability to assist the parties relative...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012806593

Strategic Transmission of Imperfect Information : Why Revealing Evidence (Without Proof) Is Difficult

Förster, Manuel - 2020

We investigate cheap talk when an imperfectly-informed expert observes multiple binary signals about a continuous state of the world. The expert may report either information on each signal separately (direct transmission) or a summary statistics of her signals (indirect transmission) to a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012849596