Many inspections are manipulable
Year of publication: |
September 2008
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Authors: | Shmaya, Eran |
Published in: |
Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in economic theory. - Toronto : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ISSN 1555-7561, ZDB-ID 2220447-7. - Vol. 3.2008, 3, p. 367-382
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Subject: | Forecasting | calibration | zero-sum games | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Ökonometrie | Econometrics | Prognose | Forecast |
Type of publication: | Article |
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Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | hdl:10419/150116 [Handle] |
Classification: | C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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Many inspections are manipulable
Shmaya, Eran, (2008)
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Many inspections are manipulable
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