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prospects of cooperation, and to different degrees. In coordination games, morality can eliminate socially inefficient …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011771133
We study impersonal exchange, and ask how agents can behave honestly in anonymous transactions without contracts. We analyze repeated anonymous random matching games, where agents observe only their own transactions. Little is known about cooperation in this setting beyond the prisoner's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012158850
In a coordination game such as the Battle of the Sexes, agents can condition their plays on external signals that can …, in theory, lead to a Correlated Equilibrium that can improve the overall payoffs of the agents. Here we explore whether … are rare. Thus, even in a world of simple learning agents, coordination behavior can take on some surprising forms. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011515836
Compliance inspection is a detailed examination procedure for determining compliance of a particular person or organisation with the given set of provisions (in regulations, standards, business rules, etc.). The optimal selection of persons or organisations and provisions for inspection is one...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013290870
resource games, and minimum effort coordination games. -- imitation ; tit-for-tat ; decision rules ; learning ; exact potential …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009743040
Under appropriate assumptions (private values and uniform punishments), the Nash equilibria of a Bayesian repeated game without discounting are payoff-equivalent to tractable, completely revealing, equilibria and can be achieved as interim cooperative solutions of the initial Bayesian game. This...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010256693
We show that the folk theorem with individually rational payoffs defined by pure strategies generically holds for a general N-player repeated game with private monitoring when the number of each player's signals is sufficiently large. No cheap talk communication device or public randomization...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013093673
This paper examines sequential equilibria of repeated games with private monitoring where signals are generally distributed. Assuming full dimensionality of payoffs and identifiability conditions of signals, we focus on games with finite stage-game actions and signals. We can construct a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012903241
Under appropriate assumptions (private values and uniform punishments), the Nash equilibria of a Bayesian repeated game without discounting are payoff-equivalent to tractable, completely revealing, equilibria and can be achieved as interim cooperative solutions of the initial Bayesian game. This...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013055418
A competition authority has an objective, which specifies what output profile firms need to produce as a function of production costs. These costs change over time and are only known by the firms. The objective is implementable if inequilibrium, the firms cannot collude on their reports to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012602309